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Company Metamorphosis: Professionalization Waves, Family Firms and Management 
Buyouts  
 
ABSTRACT 
We explore the process of professionalization pre- and post- buyout (MBO) or buyin (MBI) 
of former private family firms using longitudinal evidence from six UK family firms 
undergoing an MBO/I in 1998. Professionalization behaviour was monitored up to 2014. 
Previous studies have conceptualized professionalization as a threshold to be attained. We 
demonstrate that professionalization is a complex process occurring in waves, triggered by 
changes in firm ownership and management.  Waves of professionalization converge during 
the MBO/I process. Buyouts provide a funnelling mechanism enabling diverse control 
systems to be standardized. Post-MBO/I, divergence in the professionalization process 
reoccurs contingent on firm-specific contexts.  Professionalization focuses on operations 
when stewardship relationships predominate, but on agency control mechanisms when there 
is increased potential for agency costs.  Buyout organizational form is an important transitory 
phase facilitating the professionalization process. Professionalization is not a once for all 
development stage. 
 
Keywords: family firms; professionalization; management buyout; stewardship; agency 
 
JEL classification: D21; G32; G34; M10. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite most firms being family owned or controlled, family managers are often assumed to 
be non-professional and contrasted with non-family ‘professional’ managers (Hall and 
Nordqvist, 2008).  However, some family managers may be highly educated and skilled, 
whereas some non-family managers may not (Stewart and Hitt, 2012). Regardless, studies of 
family firms focus on introducing non-family managers as a route to professionalization 
(Dekker et al., 2015). Despite concerns (Stewart and Hitt, 2012) engagement in 
professionalization has been reduced to a binary variable.  Dekker et al., (2015) assert that 
professionalization needs to be conceptualized as a multi-faceted process.  
Professionalization is seen as a threshold stage that firms need to attain to progress.  
Professionalized firms are assumed better able to circumvent business development barriers; 
with the management style and organizational structure to ensure firm growth.  However, few 
studies have examined the dynamic professionalization process.  Even with a multi-faceted 
professionalization process approach, professionalization is often reduced to a checklist in 
cross-sectional studies exploring the link between professionalization propensity and 
variations in firm performance (Dekker et al., 2015). Cross-sectional studies provide limited 
insights into causal process relationships, being limited to analysing the co-existence of 
specific variables (Yildirim-Öktem and Üsdiken, 2010).  Professionalization does not happen 
overnight (Dekker et al., 2015).  We need, therefore, to understand the temporal dynamics of 
the process of professionalization in private family-owned firms before conclusions can be 
drawn about causality but few studies have explored the process (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008; 
De Massis, Chirico, Kotlar, and Naldi, 2014).  
Lack of understanding is partly due to the dearth of longitudinal analysis.  
Longitudinal studies are warranted to explore whether current conceptualizations of 
professionalization are appropriate for family firms (Stewart and Hitt, 2012).  We examine 
longitudinal cases of six UK private family firms over 16 years.  Professionalization is 
monitored before, during and after management buyout (MBO) or buyin (MBI).  By 
examining buyouts of private family firms, we view a discrete event relating to ownership 
and management changes. The MBO/I context contributes to understanding of family firms 
(Chrisman et al., 2012) and where the buyout may facilitate professionalization in former 
private family firms to enable future venture growth.  The selection of extreme cases where 
the former family owners and managers left  the firms to different extents over time enabled 
examination of ‘how’ the professionalization process evolved in a context of decreasing 
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family involvement (De Massis and Kotlar, 2014).  In relation to the research gap concerning 
the process of professionalization in family firms over time, we explore the following 
research question: 
Q1. How does the professionalization process evolve pre- and post-MBO/I in former 
private family firms? 
 
The cases were privately family-owned and family-managed to a greater or lesser 
extent prior to MBO or MBI.  Attitudes, goals and behaviour were monitored before, during 
and after the buyout.  This provided the opportunity to examine how the professionalization 
process evolved, and how family exit and an increase in external influences lead to changes 
in management controls and processes associated with ‘professional’ management. 
Most MBO/Is involve private largely family-owned firms (CMBOR, 2014) with 
incumbent managers taking over ownership from the former owner-manager(s).  The MBO 
team sometimes includes next generation family members.  MBIs involve a new external 
management ownership team and can be viewed as a distinct move towards 
professionalization (Gilligan and Wright, 2014).  Post-buyout the new ownership team could 
introduce more formal governance mechanisms, greater use of planning and control systems, 
and involvement of non-family board members.  MBO/Is may also be used to remove some 
family members who wish to retire, or do not contribute to future firm development 
(Howorth et al., 2004).  Family firm owners may select an MBO to enable them to exit and 
realize their investment whilst ensuring some continuity of the former dominant family ethos, 
particularly if some family members retain positions in the firm.  Stewardship relationships 
may continue post-MBO/I. 
We make the following contributions.  First, we provide fresh insights into how 
professionalization evolves and how the professionalization process varies in private family 
firms involved in MBO/Is.  Second, we illustrate that professionalization is a process 
occurring in waves, which intensify with firm ownership and management changes.  The 
MBO/I is an important transitory phase enabling former family firms to introduce formalized 
management control systems.  Conceptually, the buyout presents a funnelling mechanism 
whereby systems and controls are standardized.  Third, we highlight that post-MBO/I 
increased variation in control systems and processes are contingent upon different types of 
ownership change, and levels of continuing family involvement associated with the relative 
importance of long or short-term goals.  Fourth, we integrate insights from agency and 
stewardship theories. We conceptualize how the relevance of stewardship and agency 
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constructs change over time, shaping the nature and form of the professionalization process.  
Fifth, we contribute to understanding how family firms balance the best aspects of 
professionalization and stewardship cultures in their control systems and processes. 
Succession through MBO/I provides a juncture whereby the former private family firm 
maintains its independent ownership and sustains the stewardship culture, albeit in a 
metamorphosed state.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Family firm professionalization involves utilization of formal governance mechanisms and 
strategic planning and control systems, plus involvement of non-family members on the 
board and in the management team.  Involvement of ‘outside’ professionals can bring fresh 
objectivity to decision-making (Ibrahim et al., 2001).  It is wrong to assume that all family 
managers are inherently not professional (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008).  Despite numerous 
studies, there is no consensus relating to whether family managers benefit family firms 
(Minichilli et al., 2010). There is growing acknowledgement that the dominant view of 
professionalized family business management is overly simplistic when it focuses on non-
family manager employment (Dekker et al., 2015), notwithstanding desires to preserve 
socioemotional wealth and shortcomings relating to family management (Colombo et al., 
2014).  
Life-cycle theorists suggest introducing formal management control systems is critical 
for firm development.  Threshold firms are those around the point of transition from 
entrepreneurial to professional management (Daily and Dalton, 1992: 25).  Entrepreneurial 
management involves founder centrality, ad hoc planning and control, informal structures, 
basic budgeting, and a ‘loosely defined family-oriented culture’.  Professionalization is 
associated with an increase in management control systems and processes formalizing 
management. Many studies adopt a simplistic and narrow conceptualization of 
professionalization regarding employment of non-family managers (Chrisman et al., 2013). A 
rare longitudinal study (Lien and Li, 2014) concluded that post-initial public offering (IPO) 
family firms should combine family control with professional (i.e. non-family) management 
to improve performance.  
A multi-faceted examination of family firm professionalization is warranted.  
Professional management relates to cultural and formal competence regarding family or non-
family managers (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008).  Appreciation of dimensions of 
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professionalization has enabled identification of different types of family firms (Westhead 
and Howorth, 2007; Dekker et al., 2015). Professionalization relates to rights to use 
specialized knowledge, and morals, capability and integrity of individuals (Stewart and Hitt, 
2012), rather than increasing bureaucracy (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008). Studies generally 
provide little understanding of how professionalization evolves and how the 
professionalization process might vary. In particular, contingent factors influencing the 
professionalization process have been neglected. Contingency-based research examines links 
between structure and processes of management control systems, and contextual variables 
associated with uncertainty and external environmental complexity (Otley, 1988).  Control 
systems can relate more to firm specific contingencies post-MBO because MBOs place 
increased emphasis on operational efficiency and planning (Jones, 1992).  Yildirim-Öktem 
and Üsdiken (2010) found power and institutional perspectives were more appropriate than 
contingency theory to explore the professionalization of family business group boards, 
measured as governance structure variables rather than control systems and processes. 
However, the nature of board professionalization can be contingent upon the absorptive 
capacity of firm founders seeking to cross the professionalization threshold (Zahra et al., 
2009). The impact of professionalization on post-succession performance in family owned 
firms may be contingent upon whether succession is to a family member or a nonfamily 
professional manager (Chittoor and Das, 2007). Effecting such changes may require 
fundamental changes to organizational processes, values and culture because they may 
challenge the legacy of the founder (Gedajlovic et al., 2004).  
We develop contingency-based approaches by drawing on agency and stewardship 
theories.  These theories enable greater insights into different influences within the ownership 
and management structures shaping the professionalization process in former private family 
firms that selected MBO/Is (Howorth et al., 2004; Bruining, et al., 2013).  We conceptualize 
how the relevance of stewardship and agency constructs change over time, shaping the nature 
and form of the professionalization process.  
 
Agency Theory 
Agency theory has been used in understanding interactions between family owners and non-
family managers and in MBO/Is of family firms (Chrisman et al., 2012).  Chrisman et al., 
(2004) noted that strategic planning influenced the performance of non-family firms more 
than family firms, implying lower agency costs in family-owned firms.  Studies across the 
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MBO life-cycle provide evidence for the validity of an agency perspective (Bruton et al., 
2002) showing that post-buyout increased entrepreneurial and administrative management 
increased the likelihood of private equity (PE) investment. 
Family firms are not homogeneous because they vary in terms of goals, ownership 
and management structures (Westhead and Howorth, 2007; Kotlar and De Massis, 2013).  
Some family firms face agency problems much earlier than others. For some family firms, 
introducing governance and management mechanisms may reduce potential conflicts of 
interest between family and non-family owners and managers, and may control agency 
problems arising from altruism or nepotism (Schulze et al., 2003). 
 
Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship relationships are associated with the stereotypical family firm (Schulze et al., 
2003).  Social rather than formal controls may be used where there is high goal alignment 
(Pieper et al., 2008).  With a strong stewardship culture in a family firm, formal management 
controls associated with professionalization may be inappropriate (Stewart and Hitt, 2012).  
Some elements of this may prevail post-MBO/I to restrict the professionalization process.  
However, introduction of a PE investor may lead to a greater preponderance of agency 
relationships and precipitate the professionalization process. 
 
Summary of Theoretical Insights  
Contingency-based approaches have been criticized for overemphasizing external context 
(Otley, 1988) rather than the role of internal culture, as embodied in agency and stewardship 
perspectives, which is a key theme in family firm studies.  Prior studies provide limited 
perspectives on thresholds, succession and professionalization because they focus on ways of 
effecting succession while retaining family ownership in relation to succession as a one-off 
event.  Limited examination of internal and external influences on professionalization 
structures in family firms (i.e. narrow focus on governance variables) may, in part, explain 
the claim that contingency theory may have minimal explanatory power (Yildirim-Öktem and 
Üsdiken, 2010).  However, this may not be the case regarding professionalization processes.  
We provide fresh insights regarding the appropriateness of a contingency-based approach to 
explore internal and external firm issues shaping the professionalization process in private 
firms pre- and post-MBO/I.  The buyout can retain family ownership but involves a more 
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fundamental break with the past than succession.  Monitoring firms post-MBO/I enables 
longer-term examination of challenges in making changes to processes, values and cultures, 
which is missing in prior studies.  We hold constant key contextual variables to isolate the 
effect(s) of changes in family ownership and management on the professionalization process 
in firms over time.  Notably, we highlight links between the presence and exit of former 
family owners and managers due to the MBO/I, and the nature and form of 
professionalization processes pre- and post-MBO/I. 
Agency theory suggests that as firm ownership and management are diluted through a 
MBO/I, there will be increased need to professionalize to control agency costs.  Stewardship 
theory indicates that examination of motivations, relationships and information asymmetries 
may shed light on variations in the professionalization process, and the use of formal and/or 
social controls.  Prior to MBO/I, family firms where stewardship relationships prevail may 
have greater use of informal methods and social controls.  The MBO/I may increase 
formalization, particularly with PE firm involvement.  A longitudinal qualitative approach 
enables exploration of these complex interactions between multiple factors relating to internal 
and external environments.  A contingency-based approach building upon insights from 
agency and stewardship theories provides understanding of how the professionalization 
process evolves, particularly variations related to shifts in agency and stewardship constructs 
due to changes in family and non-family ownership and management. 
 
METHOD 
We adopt the logic of inductive inquiry that allows new theoretical insights to emerge 
through the process of gathering data from multiple sources, analysing that data through 
comparison, and iterating between emerging conceptual insights and re-examination of the 
data (Yin, 2014; Reay, 2014; De Massis and Kotlar, 2014; Fletcher et al., 2015).  A 
longitudinal study was conducted involving six UK family firms undergoing a MBO/I.  
MBO/Is provide ‘extreme cases’ (Siggelkow, 2007) for studying family firm 
professionalization because they involve a discrete event where family ownership and 
management changes to non-family.  Data were collected at MBO/I in 1998 and subsequently 
from key informants up to 2014 as detailed below.  Company reports, financial data, 
ownership and management data and media coverage were obtained across the period 1998 to 
2014. 
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Case Selection 
For the initial selection, we administered a postal questionnaire to all MBO/Is completed in 
1998 from the Centre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR) database, which 
effectively comprises the UK MBO/I population.  From survey respondents agreeing to a 
follow-up interview, we identified cases that, prior to MBO/I, met the European Union 
definition for private family firms as over 50% of shares were owned by a single family 
group related by blood or marriage, family were involved in management and the business 
was perceived as a family business (Westhead and Cowling, 1998).  We employed theoretical 
sampling to select respondents with distinct differences (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) that 
ex ante might be expected to provide variations in the professionalization process. We sought 
first and multi-generation firms because the depth of family experience can increase if more 
generations of the dominant family are involved in the firm (Astrachan et al., 2002); 
stewardship may have stronger roots and be more likely to prevail.  We included MBOs and 
MBIs because the former includes managers from within the firm and the latter involves 
external managers who may be perceived as being ‘professional’ managers.  The survey data 
also allowed us to identify cases with varying levels of family involvement post-MBO/I.  
Level of involvement of family members may shape pre- and post-MBO/I behaviour.  
Crucially, continuity of some family involvement may be associated with fewer changes 
post-MBO/I.   
 
Data Collection 
Multiple sources of evidence enabled data to be cross-checked, improving consistency and 
reliability.  The initial survey provided information on the family and the firm, perceived 
reasons for MBO/I, the deal, and changes in structure and strategy.  Face-to-face interviews 
with vendors and acquirers in 2000/1 gathered information on motivations of family firm 
owners and MBO/I teams, antecedents, the deal process, and changes post-MBO/I.  Face-to-
face and telephone interviews with surviving firms in 2006 and 2014 explored changes in 
structure, operations and strategy.  Interviews comprised open questions to avoid leading 
interviewees, focusing on changes since the previous data collection point.  Five firms 
interviewed in 2001 were re-interviewed in 2006.  One firm was not re-interviewed in 2006 
due to closure.  In 2014, ownership and management data on all six firms were obtained for 
the period pre-MBO/I to 2014.  In 2014, of surviving firms interviewed in 2006, one was 
interviewed extensively because the family still had a role in 2006, and a further two 
 10 
 
confirmed their current status by telephone.  The fourth was the subject of extensive media 
coverage following a criminal court case against the two family directors.  This firm was 
closed and subsequently sold in 2012 following their conviction. The fifth surviving firm was 
acquired in 2006.  By obtaining data across the 16 years period up to 2014, we examined all 
firms beyond final exit of vendor families.  
Nineteen interviews were held, separately, with multiple respondents from each firm 
over time.  Respondents included former family owners, members of the MBO/I teams, 
managers and senior employees.  Three interviews included two co-interviewees.  Four 
people were interviewed on multiple occasions.  Each one to two hour interview was 
recorded and transcribed verbatim.  Anonymized case characteristics are provided in Table 1. 
 
“INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE” 
 
Data Analysis Method 
Data analysis was based on interpretive methods.  Key concepts and understandings were 
developed from subjects’ interpretations.  Interview transcripts from 2001, 2006 and 2014 
were analysed manually using a three-stage process of description, inference and explanation.  
Manual coding and analysis were employed, facilitating identification of causal links and key 
concepts.  Transcripts were coded and analysed using pattern-coding, tables and matrices.  
The first author undertook initial analysis and coding.  Interpretations were checked with 
interviewees.  Patterns and inferences were discussed between authors.  Manual analysis 
allowed interviews to be read as a whole and to be critically considered within context.  Data 
analysis aimed to identify themes, consistencies or paradoxes regarding two ordered steps:  
first-order analysis examined professionalization as firms went through changes in ownership 
and management, while second-order analysis involves development of conceptual insights 
through analytical generalization.  Examples of data and early stage analysis are available in 
the online only appendix. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The professionalization processes were compared alongside changes in ownership and 
management post-MBO/I.  Levels of family ownership and management declined post-
MBO/I in all firms except TROLLEYS, which increased family ownership and was fully 
owned by the next generation of the original family six years post-MBO. Interviewees 
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evidenced views that polarized professional and family firms, consistent with earlier studies 
suggesting professionalization is simply the introduction of non-family management. Some 
non-family interviewees suggested family firms were the antithesis of ‘professional’ or 
‘proper’ firms.  “I think the company’s run more professionally now… In family firms there’s 
a lot of bickering and things… It’s not tolerated in a proper company” (PLANTS 
EMPLOYEE 2006).  Here, the MBO/I was presented as having legitimized the family firm.  
Interestingly, the externally appointed managing director (MD)1 of PLANTS stated (2001) 
“Actually the business had pretty good controls and systems, the one strength of it before I 
came in was the systems were good”.  For some, being a family firm was not something to be 
proud of.  The MD of TROLLEYS (in 2006) did not consider his firm to be a family 
business, despite being a second generation family member, and the business being owned 
fully by himself and his sister.  Negative connotations of family business were more 
prevalent among firms managed very ad hoc pre-MBO/I which reported few formal controls 
and processes.  In all these cases (PLANTS, PIPES and TROLLEYS), the firms were 
previously owner-managed, and dominated by one individual.  A contra effect involved some 
non-family managers joining the smaller former private family firms, in part, due to prior 
negative experience of ‘professional’ management in large companies.  These differences 
indicate a dichotomized view of family versus ‘professional’ management is an over-
simplification of the professionalization process. 
 
Professionalization in family firms pre-MBO/I 
Contrary to life-cycle perspectives, there were no discernible patterns in professionalization 
relative to firm size or age.  The largest firms (DUMPS and PLANTS) and the oldest (PIPES) 
reported ad hoc and unsystematic management pre-MBO/I. This highlights that 
professionalization does not happen automatically as family firms grow, and suggests other 
factors influence the professionalization process.  
Within-case and cross-case analysis identified variation in levels and focus of 
professionalization pre-MBO/I.  Nearly all cases indicated owner-centric management and 
non-participatory leadership processes pre-MBO/Is.  For example, “The guy who ran the 
business knew everything, could do everybody’s job better than they could” (PLANTS MD); 
                                                 
1
 MD = Commonly used term relating to privately held firms in the UK, and is equivalent to Chief Executive 
Officer. 
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and “It was a one-man band in a way” (PLANTS VENDOR).  Vendors, employees, MBO/I 
team members and family members provided evidence of non-participatory leadership.     
Cases varied in their introduction of external (non-family) managers: “I’d tried to 
bring in senior people and for one reason or another it hadn’t worked” (PLANTS, 
VENDOR 2001); “He had a number of contractor directors…and they were highly 
incentivized…that’s how he had grown the business” (DUMPS MD 2001).  A shared 
leadership model was observed in LOCKS, where the Chair was a family owner and the MD 
was appointed externally years prior to MBO.   
Variation in management control processes pre-MBO/Is ranged from non-existent to 
sophisticated use: “We’ve got very good financial management controls in place (which) 
we’ve built up over many years….There weren’t a lot of additional things (i.e. changes post 
MBO)” (LOCKS MD 2001), compared with: “What used to happen, because [family 
owners] had loads of money… [family owner] would just wander round the warehouse, if the 
bin was empty he’d just go away and order a pallet load of those fittings and then he could 
forget about it for six months” (PIPES ACC 2001).  Fewer management control processes 
were associated with the most owner-centric family firms.   
Introduction of management control processes occurred incrementally over many 
years, suggesting professionalization was not a single action event.  Cross-case analysis 
indicated the validity of a contingency-based explanation of why some firms were slower to 
professionalize.  For example, PIPES had ‘plenty of cash’; BOXES’ ‘sales were good’; and 
PLANTS was well-placed as the leading supplier in their industry.  Firms with fewer 
management control processes (PIPES) tended to have less uncertainty and complexity, 
particularly in their sales environment and were in slow-changing, low-technology industries. 
Firms with more management controls and processes pre-MBO/I (LOCKS) were in more 
complex industries, facing greater sales uncertainty.  Stewardship relationships might 
increase internal certainty within private family firms, and thus be associated with fewer 
formal management controls and less likelihood to seek managers externally.   
 
Professionalization in preparation for exit and succession 
The MBO/I boosted the professionalization process, forming part of exit preparations in some 
firms.  External advisers were employed in all cases.  Firms preparing for MBI were more 
likely to implement new processes than those preparing for MBO.  Also, firms targeting PE 
funding were more likely to put new processes and structures in place pre-MBO/I.  For 
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example: “He [vendor] dressed it up a little bit, for example, did he have a business 
development manager?  Yes he did but only just, he’d just appointed him, probably after he’d 
started speaking to me” (DUMPS, MD 2001).  LOCKS and BOXES, not funded by PE, 
placed greater emphasis on knowledge transfer pre- and post-MBO.  Both paid less attention 
to management control processes, and ‘window dressing’.   Private family firms preparing for 
MBO/I appear more likely to boost the professionalization process when it is anticipated that 
buying teams will include members external to the family firm (e.g. PE investor, MBI team), 
in line with agency theoretic notions of signalling. 
 
Professionalization post-MBO/I 
Without prompting, interviewees used the word ‘professional’ in discussing changes post-
MBO/I.  BOXES thought they were “more professional in what they do”.  Three cases 
introduced ‘external’ MDs.  In each, the MDs talked about professionalizing as making 
improvements reflecting their experience in larger companies (i.e. decentralizing control).  
The MD and lead member of the MBI team in DUMPS stated they intended to “get this team 
and manage it professionally…give people more authority…more freedom”.  An employee in 
PLANTS, mentioned earlier, stated that the company was “run more professionally now”.  
To confirm her view, the former family owner’s attitude is exemplified in describing the 
incoming MBO team as follows: “They did… business planning, all this sort of rubbish”.  
The new MD of PLANTS stated the importance of bringing in “professional management”, 
but explained that employees placed a low value on his management experience compared to 
knowing the names of all the plants.   
Within-case analysis showed the MBO/I led to increased professionalization across 
every firm.  Where not already in place, the MBO/I triggered an increased focus on 
profitability, more control processes,  performance-related rewards, formal governance 
structure, participative leadership, changes in organization structures, and more strategic 
planning.  There was considerable consistency of mechanisms adopted immediately post-
MBO/I.  All firms without monthly management accounts introduced them post-MBO/I, 
irrespective of type of MBO/I funding.   LOCKS had formal structures and systems pre-
MBO, but post-MBO, there was increased decentralization, changes in management 
structure, and formalization of governance roles. 
The professionalization process was implemented through personnel changes: “so the 
team was changed” [PLANTS MD 2006 discussing 1999]; and structure changes 
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“engineering business is [now] split into three [with] their own operating budgets and 
financial targets and controls” (LOCKS MD 2001].  Training and staff development were 
emphasized to enable professionalization processes: “We’ve trained all the sales staff, 
trained the admin staff, a bit more discipline in terms of administration, rules and 
regulations, health and safety, to try and help develop the people” (TROLLEYS MD 2001). 
All firms, except TROLLEYS, had an external board representative.  In some (PIPES and 
PLANTS), PE investors appointed external MDs.  PLANTS and PIPES suffered difficulties 
due to poor management skills of second-generation family members who wished to be 
involved post-MBO/I.  These firms brought in external MDs within two years post-MBO/I.  
In both, this was the major trigger for increased professionalization.  For PIPES, this included 
replacing ‘stock control by wandering’ with management and stock control processes plus 
computerized invoicing.   
In several firms, where professionalization led to tightening up of slack, there was 
some employee resistance, notably when firms attempted to link bonuses to performance 
(DUMPS and PIPES).  Clearly, there is potential for self-interest in private family firms and 
non-family firms.  
MBO/Is introduced an additional layer of complexity due to the financial risk of debt 
in the deal structure.  Contingency-based research has associated such factors with an 
increase in management control systems (Jones, 1992).  PE investors especially bring the 
firm into a new agency relationship.  There can be strict requirements for control systems and 
higher leverage requires closer monitoring of cash flow.  MBI teams, as outsiders, are more 
likely to experience uncertainty due to asymmetric information challenges and associated 
agency relationships within the firm.  To address these issues they, therefore, introduce 
agency controls.   
In sum, the MBO/I acts like a ‘funnelling mechanism’ shaping the professionalization 
process post-MBO/I.  Despite divergence in former private family firms pre-MBO/I, there is 
considerable convergence of professionalization post-MBO/I.  Irrespective of background, 
post-MBO/I firms exhibited considerable consistency in governance structures, control 
systems and processes introduced. Personnel changes were important in driving 
professionalization.  
 
Later years: post-family exit 
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To examine patterns in changes in professionalization beyond the MBO/I transition period we 
analysed the period 8 to 16 years post-MBO/I.  By 2006, consistent with PE time horizons 
(Gilligan and Wright, 2014), PE firms had exited most firms.  Vendor families varied in their 
involvement post-MBO/I.  By 2006, only TROLLEYS and LOCKS still had vendor family 
involvement.  Further ownership changes were common-place, often in a move towards 
ownership consolidation.  There was no discernible pattern concerning the vendor family 
concluding exit, and the introduction of further professionalization.  By 2014, LOCKS had no 
family involvement, and formal management structures were more relaxed. “It’s 
disintegrated…until 2013…very formal systems…we don’t meet as often as we used to” 
(LOCKS, MD, 2014).  In contrast, other firms introduced more formal systems when family 
involvement ended (PLANTS and BOXES).  Introduction of formal control processes led to 
exit of the remaining family member in PIPES. 
Eight years post-MBO/I, and after PE investor exit, data show further waves and 
ripples of professionalization, but with a shift in emphasis, and considerable variation among 
firms.  The professionalization process over this time period emphasized more strategic 
planning, financial planning, training and development, innovation and culture changes.  
Control systems and processes were now discussed in terms of ‘how’ they were used rather 
than ‘what’ they consisted of as highlighted in earlier interviews.  For example, the 
commercial director of BOXES had previously discussed budget minutiae, but now 
emphasized how the tools were used, and how they helped him understand what was going 
on.  Interviewees illustrated increased taken-for-granted mastery over controls and systems.  
The professionalization process was enhanced by interviewees’ stronger views about what 
worked.  Interviewees were also more open about when they got something wrong.  
Interestingly, by this stage there was divergence because some firms no longer used external 
directors.  “We had one guy who was a non-executive director, we got to a point that we felt 
we didn’t need him…  After we talked to the bank they felt comfortable that we were as a 
team, perhaps experienced enough not to need that” (BOXES MD 2006); “[PE] think 
they’ve got their man in and actually, you know, he’s 90% on your side… When he first came 
in we’d have a pre-board meeting so he didn’t effectively manage the board …By the time he 
left it was a 2 hour board meeting looking at strategy and real issues” (PLANTS MD 2006); 
and “[Non-executive directors] No never have done.  I think there was lots of pressure from 
the VC back…. but we just dug our heels in and said no… We do have an external guy we 
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work with… we have a formal meeting with him every two months, off-site, fixed agenda, 
minutes, …and it works very well” (TROLLEYS MD 2006). 
In 2006, there was more evidence of elements associated with stewardship relationships 
than observed immediately post-MBO/I.  Interviewees reported high identification with the 
organization, involvement oriented, low power distance cultures, and a tendency to put the 
business’ objectives above personal ones.  Centralization of management highlighted in 
surviving firms appeared associated with strong firm attachment and longer-term goals.  For 
example, “For me, it’s a long-term thing you know.  I’ve worked here pretty much since I left 
college… it’s my life… I love it… I’m here for the long haul” (BOXES, internal MD, 2006).  
Interviewees brought in as ‘external’ MDs, however, showed less attachment and shorter-
term goals: “Actually I’m doing a job, it’s not an extension of my personality” (PLANTS, 
external MD, 2006). 
The professionalization process was linked to changes in organizational culture.  For 
example, “the big challenge was changing it from a family culture to a… professional 
culture… we were able to instil in people that they were part of the team.  Their job wasn’t to 
do what [family owner] said, their job was to offer their skills, their intelligence to do the 
best job they could” (PLANTS MD 2006).  However, the same interviewee went onto 
highlight a reversion to a ‘family culture’: “over the last seven years, we’ve removed [PE] as 
a shareholder… and it’s almost come full circle back to being almost like the family business 
again… but with a different culture”.  The interviewee indicated the firm had achieved a 
balance between the best aspects of professional and family cultures, but “the one thing I’ve 
got to be aware of is that I don’t just start slowly dripping in what’s wrong about a family 
business back into it” (PLANTS MD 2006). 
In line with contingency-based approaches, analysis suggests once standard control 
processes associated with professionalization were in place, firms adapted and developed in 
diverse directions, depending on individual circumstances.  Firm goals also shaped the 
professionalization process.  For example, LOCKS’ MD in 2014 took a long-term view: 
“Constantly thinking about succession planning…always had this cycle, this up and down 
cycle…we’ve persevered...we’ve spent 10 years developing new products for different 
markets and these are sustainable” (LOCKS, MD, 2014).  The emphasis was on introducing 
management processes concerning product quality control and product development.  In 
contrast, PIPES had a clear goal to sell the firm.  Here, management control processes 
remained tight in order to maintain firm saleability.  
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“INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE” 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Findings 
Our analysis shows that ‘threshold’ conceptualisations of a once-for-all shift from 
entrepreneurialism to professionalization are an oversimplification.  Table 2 summarizes our 
main findings, highlighting that professionalization is a process rather than an event, 
occurring in waves of varying sizes and foci.  Despite variations in level and focus pre-
MBO/I, professionalization increased post-MBO/I, characterized by convergence, with firms  
reporting comparable levels of formalization and introduction of similar controls. Figure 1 
represents this funnelling effect on the professionalization process that generally resulted in 
adoption of standardized management control processes post-MBO/I.  Figure 1 and Table 2 
also demonstrate the continuation of the professionalization process post-MBO/I over many 
years.  Figure 1 illustrates that pre-MBO/I there was considerable variation in levels and foci 
of professionalization, contingent on the specific context of each firm.  Stewardship 
relationships moderated the contingency imperative: where stewardship relationships were 
strong, fewer formal controls and therefore less professionalization was evident.  In preparing 
for MBO/I, Figure 1 shows that professionalization through formalization increases.  Where 
sale is to external parties (MBI), signalling is more relevant; furthermore professionalization 
at this stage is moderated by the type of funding as PE investors might have greater 
information asymmetry, and signalling becomes more important than with debt funding.  
Thus, agency theory dominates explanations of professionalization at this stage. During and 
immediately after MBO/I, analysis showed standardization and increasing of 
professionalization.  This funnelling effect is driven by increased involvement of external, 
non-family managers and investors and is moderated by levels of uncertainty and risk faced 
by individual firms; greater uncertainty and risk strengthens the effect of external managers 
and investors on professionalization.  In later stages post-MBO/I, Figure 1 illustrates the 
greater divergence observed as firms continued to professionalize in directions contingent on 
their own individual circumstances, internally and externally. 
 
“INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE” 
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Changes in ownership and management triggered ‘waves of professionalization’.  
Notably, in later years, specific variations in ownership or management could lead to a focus 
on operational controls, or agency control mechanisms.  We detect that agency theory alone 
does not fully explain changes in management control systems and processes.  Stewardship 
relationships were associated with emphasis on operational control processes to manage the 
business, rather than agency controls to align motivations.  Longer-term stewardship 
relationships re-emerged once agency relationships had been reduced, for example, following 
exit of financial investors. 
Figure 2 highlights the drivers and moderators of different professionalization waves, 
illustrating most powerfully that drivers and moderators differ across waves.  Figures 1 and 2 
emphasize the value of employing complementary theories to understand changes in 
professionalization over time.  By utilizing a longitudinal approach, we extend insights from 
relatively narrow cross-sectional contingency-based approaches that explain the introduction 
of control processes to help understand the professionalization process.  We suggest that 
cross-sectional quantitative studies may have severe limitations in assessing the level of 
professionalization achieved.  Future longitudinal quantitative studies will provide additional 
insights relating to the scale and nature of the adoption of particular types of controls, 
structures and systems. 
 
“INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE” 
 
Implications for private family firms post-MBO/I  
Our rich longitudinal analysis highlights there was no simple consistent pattern of association 
between family exit and the professionalization process.  Where family members had a long-
term continuing role post-MBO/I, exit was associated with relaxation of management control 
processes.  For some family members, increased management control processes post-MBO/I 
constrained ability to act in pursuit of their own goals, leading to exit.  
Notably, buyouts can provide a dynamic mechanism to reconcile notions of 
professionalization and stewardship within former private family firms.  This suggests family 
owners not wishing to effect succession may trigger the professionalization process by, say, 
introducing external management.  External managers can have a key role in triggering a 
professionalization wave concerning the introduction of management controls and processes.  
Family firms seeking to retain some family ethos following exit might consider MBOs rather 
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than MBIs.  To realize this choice, family firms may need to build a credible tier of non-
family management before MBO for it to be feasible.  Successful firms post-MBO/I can also 
remove negative aspects associated with being a family firm (i.e. free-riding, shirking and 
inequitable treatment).  However, post-MBO/I they need to build on positive aspects 
associated with being a family firm (i.e. loyalty, long-term commitment and trust).  MBO/I 
succession provides a juncture when the status quo regarding family, management and 
ownership interaction can be reconfigured.  This may be more difficult to achieve in a linear 
progression to family ownership succession.  Post-MBO/I, there may be resistance to being 
perceived as a family firm because it is ‘less professional’, not helped by some 
conceptualizations distinguishing between family and ‘professional’ management suggesting 
family managers are inherently not professional (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008). 
Our findings may assist family firm owners, potential MBO/I teams, and their 
advisors and financiers.  Sustainability of elements of stewardship can underpin long-term 
strategy.  Failure to acknowledge this, and over-emphasis on agency issues, may lead to 
misunderstanding of the motivations of firms, and potentially lead to provision of 
inappropriate advice.  An MBO/I may provide an important transitory form that facilitates 
professionalization.  Advisors and PE financiers may need to structure MBO/Is to incorporate 
longer-term independent ownership rather than exit as a trade sale, such as by promoting the 
extended application of secondary MBOs (CMBOR, 2014).  Family firms should carefully 
consider the nature of PE firms because they differ in terms of their investment exit time 
horizons. 
  
Limitations and further research 
Limitations provide avenues for further research.  First, research is needed using a wider 
representative sample of former private family firms selecting a MBO/I succession route to 
establish the empirical generalizability of our insights.  Second, studies are needed to 
examine the issues considered here in other institutional contexts where notions of agency, 
stewardship and family firm succession may be different, but where MBO/Is play a role in 
succession.  This may add to the development of the contingency perspective presented here. 
Third, our selection of extreme cases focuses only on different types of MBO/Is; a further 
interesting extension would be to compare MBO/Is with the development of 
professionalization in family firms that undertake succession to subsequent generations, or 
external management.  Future research might also compare how the professionalization 
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process evolves in other succession contexts.  For example, some family firms effect exit 
through being acquired by corporations, but may subsequently buy the firm back.  Similarly, 
some MBO/Is of family firms are subsequently rebought by the family.  Fourth, we did not 
explore the relationship between firm professionalization and buyout performance.  A 
different research design may be required to explore links with firm performance.   
Notwithstanding these limitations, our analysis highlights that the process of family 
firm development is not linear.  Presented longitudinal case evidence illustrates that it is more 
complex, and is associated with waves of professionalization.  This finding opens the way for 
more general studies of professionalization in family firms guided by insights from 
stewardship and agency perspectives. 
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Table 1 Case Descriptions 
 LOCKS BOXES DUMPS PIPES PLANTS TROLLEYS 
Industry Engineering Paper/print Construction Merchant Horticulture Engineering 
Founded 1965 1963 1979 Pre-1928 1972 1979 
Turnover £m 1998 : 
2005  
4.6 : 3.8 2.5 : not known 20 : n.a. 4 : 18.2** 24 : 30.4 6  
Employees 1998 : 
2005/6 
120 : 99 45 : 25 114 : n.a. 30 : 75 300 : 221 65 : 60 
Deal finance Debt. Debt. Private equity 
(captive). 
Private equity 
(independent). 
Private equity 
(captive). 
Private equity 
(captive). 
Vendor succession 
style 
Staged exit: Co-
operative and 
participative. 
Retirement, 
ambassador, co-
operative. 
Retirement, 
hedonist, 
antagonistic. 
Illness, low 
knowledge transfer. 
Retirement, co-
operative. 
Illness, un-co-
operative. 
Ownership changes 
since 1998 
Former owner’s 
minority shares 
bought in 2006. 
2nd MBO in 2006 Closed in 2003. 
Subsidiary sold out 
of receivership. 
MBI team bought 
out in 2000.  
2006 bought by 
competitor. 
MBO team xc 1 
sold in 2001. 2 VCs 
bought out in 
2004/6. 76% owned 
by MD; 24% by FD.  
MBO lead and VC 
bought out 2001. 
Other MBO 
member bought out 
2003.  
Control changes  MD retired in 2002. 
New board structure 
in 2006. 
Changes in directors 
in 1999, 2002 and 
2004. MD resigned 
in 2003.  
New board structure 
in 2000, 2006. 
Changes in directors 
in 2005 and 2007.  
MD replaced in 
1999. Director 
resignations in 
2000, 2001. 2003 
and 2004. 
New board structure 
2004. 
Family involvement Family vendor on 
board until 2006. 
12.5% in trust for 
family. 
None in firm. 
Family own 
business’ premises. 
None since MBI. Son of vendor 
employed until 
2000. 
Son of vendor 
employed as 
director until 2000. 
Continuing. 50/50 
owned by son and 
daughter of vendor 
and founder. 
MBO team 
involvement 
All original team 
still involved in 
similar roles. 
1 of 4 first MBO 
team in 2nd MBO. 
MBI lead resigned 
in 2003. One 
involved till 
liquidation. 
All MBI team 
resigned by 2000. 
FD was 1 of 4 in 
original team. 
2 of 4 in original 
team 
Interviewed 2006? MD MD No Financial controller MD and employee MD 
 
Notes: *Last complete financial year pre-MBO/I. **2006 data because 2005 not available. n.a. = not available.  MD = Managing director; FD = Financial director; VC= private equity company.   
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Table 2: Waves of Professionalization: Summary of Findings 
 
 
 
 Family Firm Pre-MBO/I Preparation for MBO/I Immediately Post-MBO/I Later years  
Professionalization 
is characterized by: 
• Variation 
• Low levels 
• Increase 
• Window dressing 
• Funnelling 
mechanism 
• Increase 
• Convergence 
• Divergence 
Common themes 
include: 
• Owner-centric 
• Ad hoc control 
• Fire fighting 
• Formalization 
 
• Standardization 
• Agency controls 
• Talk about being 
‘professional’ 
• Mastery of 
management tools 
• Reflexive and 
proactive 
• External director 
exit 
Professionalization 
process occurs 
through: 
• Incremental 
adjustments 
• Tightening 
operational controls 
• Formalizing roles 
• Personnel changes 
• Structure changes 
• Incentivization 
• ‘Tweaking’ 
• Staff development 
• External 
representation 
• Staff development 
• Culture change 
• Long-term 
planning 
• Simplification and 
extension 
Changes in 
professionalization 
are associated with: 
• Contingency-
based 
explanations 
• Complexity and 
uncertainty 
• Recommendation of 
external advisors 
• Expectation of 
external sale 
• External investors’ 
requirements 
• External 
appointments 
• Contingency-based 
adaptation to 
context 
• Goals of the owner 
manager  
• Investor exit (but 
not family exit) 
Influences are 
moderated by: 
• Stewardship 
relationships  
• Type of funding pre-
MBO/I  
• Uncertainty 
• Financial risk  
• Family 
involvement 
Dominant 
explanatory theory 
• Contingency 
• Stewardship 
• Agency • Agency • Contingency 
• Stewardship 
Figure 1: Funnelling Effect of MBO/I on Professionalisation 
 
Standardisation 
Pre-MBO/I 
Preparation for  
MBO/I 
Post-MBO/I 
Later years 
Contingency 
Stewardship 
Contingency 
Stewardship 
Agency 
Agency 
Variation 
Formalization 
Divergence 
Phase Dominant Theory 
 Figure 2: Waves of Professionalization: Drivers and Moderators 
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